
Dawnland Directors' Decisions: 17th-Century Encounter Dynamics on the Wabanaki Frontier



ALVIN H. MORRISON
SUNY College at Fredonia

Introduction

This paper is an outline of the 17th-century frontier dynamics in the Dawnland, summarizing several Wabanaki Algonquian leaders' responses to the stimuli of both French and English intrusions. The Dawnland, or Wabanakia, is the region from the Gaspé Peninsula on the north, to Cape Breton Island on the east, to Cape Ann (Gloucester, Massachusetts) on the south, to Lake Champlain on the west. The Wabanaki peoples called all of the Dawnland their longtime traditional homeland, but the newly arriving French claimed most of the eastern part, calling it their "Acadia", which overlapped much of the southern portion that the suddenly encroaching English claimed as part of their "New England."

Few comic operas start with as farcical a stage-setting of dissension, yet this drama was destined to develop into the all-time great North American tragedy. It was to become as interminable as it was inevitable, with the consequences still unfolding in today's current events of Quebec separatism and Indian land disputes in both Canada and the United States — to say nothing of the long-standing and ongoing social discriminations that have led to these present situations.

The Wabanaki peoples of today are, from east to west, Micmac, Maliseet, Passamaquoddy, Penobscot, and Abenaki. The Smithsonian *Handbook of North American Indians*. Volume 15: *Northeast* (Trigger 1978) categorizes them as Micmac, Maliseet-Passamaquoddy, Eastern Abenaki, and Western Abenaki. Some among them still speak their native languages, called herein Micmac, Maliseet-Passamaquoddy, and Penobscot-Abnaki-Pennacook. For our 17th-century analysis, the Wabanaki peoples of that time will be referred to herein as Micmac, Etchemin, and Abnaki-Pennacook. The complexities of who became what, and where and when, are outside of our immediate focus (see Bourque 1989; Prins 1986; and Morrison 1978 for those details).




Sagamores

The sociopolitical leaders of the Wabanaki peoples were called *sagamores*. It was the sagamores who had to make the decisions for their peoples' well-being. Thus, it is the sagamores' responses during the 1600s that best illustrate the felt stimuli of the early intrusive Europeans on the Wabanaki collectively. In an earlier paper, titled "Dawnland Directors" (Morrison 1976), I have analyzed at length the status and role of 17th-century Wabanaki sagamores. A brief summary of that analysis follows now.

To enhance modern interpretation of ethnohistorical descriptions, I have devised a three-part theoretical model of Wabanaki sagamores at work. First, Morton H. Fried's (1960:718-719) structure model of leadership in the redistributive "rank society" fits the Wabanaki peoples perfectly. Second, Ronald Cohen's (1973:873) motive model of the "politically rational man — one who would rather win than lose" suits the sagamore's prestige-building needs admirably. Third, Bronislaw Malinowski's (1926 in 1948:144ff) validation model of the "myth as charter" for perfidiously dealing with "enemies" clearly reflects the trickster's prerogative of double-dealing, found in Wabanaki myths about the sagamore's role-model — Gluskap the culture-hero. The intent of my composite model is to allow interpreting specific (emic) Wabanaki data in a general (etic) cross-cultural frame of reference for better understanding; I believe it succeeds therein, thus increasing the value of the data.

A Wabanaki sagamore usually inherited his position through his elite lineage. He then needed to earn public recognition for manifesting superior personal ability: in leading men by his example; in inspiring confidence in his wisdom and physical prowess; in proving his concern for and generosity toward others; in attaining success in hunting, diplomacy, warfare, and especially supernatural affairs (which could influence most other things). The greatest Wabanaki sagamores were themselves also shamans and *ginaps* (supernaturally endowed war leaders). Less eminent sagamores merely controlled the services of these specialists. Any sagamore needed all of the supportive props that he could accumulate to enhance his image and influence, because he had no sovereign political or economic authority in the usual sense of the term.

A relatively fluid and voluntary association of men delegated to a sagamore whom they respected the responsibility — not the authority — for their welfare. Only in warfare was authority an expected feature of leadership. Every sagamore usually seems to have had a Council of Elders to advise him. Even though he acted as economic redistribution agent for his constituency (usually a kinship-structured village band, or *deme*, sometimes a plurality thereof), a sagamore could amass no greater accumulation of tangible riches than his people thought fitting. General respect and well-



Legend

Water

A	Androscoggin River
C1	Casco Bay, ME
C2	Chaleur Bay, NB/PQ
F	Fundy Bay
J	St. John River
K	Kennebec River
L	St. Lawrence River
M	Merrimac River
P	Penobscot River
S	Saco River

Land

1	Port Royal (NS)
2	Quebec City (PQ)
3	Norridgewock (ME)
4	Boston (MA)
5	Castine (ME)
6	Plymouth (MA)
7	Pemaquid (ME)
8	Concord (NH)
9	St. Francis (PQ)
10	Portland (ME)
11	Wells (ME)

earned deference to his opinions were his true worldly treasures. However, if public deference extended beyond appropriate foci, and/or if the elders' advisory inputs decreased, a particularly strong sagamore easily could become haughty and authoritative. Theory and practice could diverge, and sometimes did.

The few cases of paramount-sagamores among the Wabanaki must have been built upon extraordinary personal capabilities and charisma, yet this status and role seem more shadow than substance. Micmac Membertou clearly achieved his prominence by parlaying his French connections. Etchemin Madockawando may have been ascribed his potentiality, by birth and/or adoption; he seems to have been some kind of heir to the legendary Bashaba. Pennacook Passaconaway's greatness is too hyperbolized even to guess about its origins, yet his son Wanalancet inherited his eminence. Clearly, the decisions made by these paramount-sagamores seem to have had paramount influence among their respective peoples.

Encounters

Since the focus of this paper is on Wabanaki sagamores' responses, only the most succinct summaries of European contact stimuli must suffice here.

French-Wabanaki relations centered around three main themes: the priority and pervasiveness of French contacts with the Wabanaki in the 1500s; the two-fronted French push into Wabanakia in the 1600s from both Bay of Fundy and St. Lawrence River areas; and the French use of the Wabanaki in the 1600s as first commercial, then military, partners (albeit manipulated junior partners in both cases). Each of these themes was uniquely French. Each, also, was directly and irrevocably influential in changing Wabanaki society and culture. They involve factors of history, geography, and economy, respectively, which tended to unite French and Wabanaki, for better and for worse, in a dependency relationship, each on the other. Yet, it was a union of convenience, and both parties knew it. With the perspective of history at our disposal, we can see today that, on balance, by 1700, the French contacts were more influential in changing Wabanaki society and culture than the English contacts.

The 17th-century English-Wabanaki contacts also had three central themes: English extreme ethnocentrism toward Indians; Wabanaki preference for English trade goods or prices; and English competition with the Wabanaki for land. Ethnocentrism was not unique to the English except in extremity. Not all Wabanaki always preferred English trade goods or prices, but enough did to make it a constant stimulus to continue tolerating (even seeking) English presence. The English competition for Wabanaki land was a unique and constant theme; when coupled with English ethnocentrism, it was the source of recurring conflict. Only the trade theme worked toward

unifying Englishmen and Wabanaki, while the other two themes made bitter enmities.

Jealous over English trade superiority, the French tried to make political profit by emphasizing the English ethnocentrism and land hunger to the Wabanaki, while stressing their own compatibility with the Indians. However, the importance of English trade with the Indians increased Wabanaki wariness of siding more fully with the French, in the 17th century certainly, if less clearly so later. So, if the English contacts accomplished nothing else, at least they prevented even greater Frenchification of the Wabanaki.

Decisions in Context

Membertou

Against the backdrop of the French intrusion into Wabanakia, the decisions of Micmac sagamore Membertou mark a Wabanaki turning point. After Membertou accommodated the first official French settlers, the Dawnland became a twilight zone between old and new. Membertou's decisions followed a century of unofficial trial contacts, obscure in detail but obvious in outcome.

When the first two official explorers for France, Verrazanno and Cartier, visited Wabanakia in 1524 and 1534, respectively, the Abnakis at Casco Bay, Maine, and the Micmacs at Chaleur Bay, in New Brunswick and Quebec, already knew about trading furs for European implements. This exchange, which by the end of the 1500s came to be called "the French Trade", was not without devastating side effects.

According to French Jesuit missionary Pierre Biard (1611, 1616), the Micmacs related personal or family historical knowledge of the radical depopulation of each nearby coast which had been visited by unofficial French (and other) fishermen-traders. Each native community or nomadic band had lost its balanced economy, traditional diet, and well-adapted health, after taking on the new monofocal and seasonal specialty of fur-trading. Yet Membertou heartily welcomed Du Gua de Monts, the first royal monopolist for fur trading in Acadia, when de Monts decided to build a permanent settlement, called Port Royal (Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia), in Membertou's territory, in 1605.

Within two years, Membertou parlayed his French connection into supplying him with firearms to help him win a revenge raid on the "Almouchiquois" village of Chouacoet, at the mouth of the Saco River in southwestern Maine. This Micmac sack of Saco in summer 1607 apparently marks the first documented use of firearms by Native Americans against Native Americans in the Northeast. The French were quite favourably impressed by both Membertou's far-flung alliance of Micmac and Etchemin warriors and his trouncing of his far-away trading rival, Abnaki-Pennacook sagamore

Olmechin. Geographer-Royal Champlain wrote about the raid in some detail, and lawyer-adventurer Marc Lescarbot even composed an epic poem, "The Defeat of the Armouchiquois Savages", as well as describing the raid in prose. Lescarbot claimed Membertou was over 100 years old. Clearly, he was a *ginap*, a supernaturally endowed war leader, as well as a sagamore and shaman. (See Morrison 1975 and Goetz 1975 for sources and details regarding Membertou's raid.)

Under French influence, Membertou unquestionably became a paramount sagamore, whatever he had been before. He also renounced his shamanic practice to become a Christian — the first Native American leader to be converted at home. Indeed, Membertou and 20 members of his extended family were baptized 24 June 1610, ready or not, for French fund-raising publicity. Eventually the French gratuitously titled him the first Hereditary Grand Chief of the Micmacs, apparently on no other grounds than sheer appreciation for Membertou's cooperation in helping them to found their Acadia in his part of Wabanakia.

Before one succumbs to any sort of easy monocular conclusion, from "secular selfishness" to "salvation secured", regarding not only Membertou's pro-French decisions but also the Kennebec Abnaki case which follows below, one first should consider a broader potentiality. Historian Neal Salisbury (1982:37-39) aptly describes the adaptive flexibility of Algonquian ideology, with its openness to new inputs:

[*Manitou*] . . . referred to the manifestation of spiritual power, a manifestation that could occur in almost any form. Belief in *manitou* . . . enabled its adherents to accommodate traditional religion to changing circumstances. For, as [Roger] Williams put it, they [(Algonquians)] attributed to *manitou* 'every thing which they cannot comprehend.' Rather than rejecting that which was unknown, they welcomed it and sought to come to terms with it.

The "mysteries" of 17th-century French Catholicism must have had a genuine fascination to the Wabanaki. Surely they would have found Catholicism more compatible than English Puritanism, even if Puritanism had been equally offered to them, which largely it was not. But sharing in the newcomers' religion and sharing with them the use of Indian lands both must have seemed to Wabanaki leaders to be very logical decisions indeed, as adaptive responses to the European arrivals in Wabanakia (provided that the newcomers were friendly, and stayed so). Clearly the whites had technological *manitou*, if nothing else — so why not accept them and learn more about their "faith"?

In such adaptive flexibility is strength; not weakness, but the very essence of bending without breaking. The European constraints of exclusive religious practice or land use certainly could not have been foreseen by the Wabanaki (i.e., exclusive takeover, as opposed to merely adding to existing

religious beliefs or current land users). These monopolistic mental-sets of the whites should be faulted more than the wrong assumptions made by the Wabanaki, as the prime cause of the troubles ahead, in the Dawnland.

Druillettes

On the other French front, the St. Lawrence River, inland Abnakis learned from Montagnais friends about the "Black Robes" who brought the French religion to the Indians. In 1646, the same year that the Iroquoian Mohawks of eastern New York killed Jesuit missionary Isaac Jogues as an unwelcome intruder among them, the Kennebec River Abnakis of western Maine eagerly sought a resident missionary of their own from Jesuit headquarters in Quebec City. They were sent Father Gabriel Druillettes, who earlier had enjoyed popularity and success with the Montagnais. Père Gabriel founded for the Abnakis the Mission of the Assumption at Norridgewock on the Kennebec.

Druillettes was both adopted and honored by the Abnakis. His three stays with them were all short enough that they yearned for more, never having the opportunity to tire of his presence among them. He became an actual leader of the Abnaki simply because they wanted him to be so. Whether just any Jesuit would have been so well received is unlikely.

Père Gabriel had such charisma that he even favourably impressed the English leaders he encountered, not only on the frontier but in Puritan Boston and other New England cities which he visited from 1650 to 1652 as a diplomatic envoy for the French and Algonquians. Yet his assignment was too unrealistic to succeed — namely, to form a defensive military alliance among French and Algonquians and English against the Iroquois menace, then at its height (see Morrison 1984).

While Druillettes was the first white man known to have been chosen as an Abnaki leader, he was not alone in such an honor. Even the son of two English captives, Joseph-Louis Gill (d. 1798), became a principal chief of the St. Francis/Odanak Abenakis in the next century. When appropriate individuals and circumstances merited such flexibility of choice, "racism" was absent as an interference.

Saint-Castin

Because the several New England colonial governments would not join New France's proposed military alliance against the marauding Iroquois in 1650, the French and their Indian allies had to seek other means to protect themselves. New England simply did not feel threatened by the Iroquois. Indeed, starting in 1675, in King Philip's War, some English colonies actually hired Iroquois mercenaries to fight their Algonquian enemies. So, starting in 1665, the French solution was found by calling in the well seasoned

Wars with Actual (1-6) or Potential (7-8) Conflict
between New Englanders and Wababaki*

- | | |
|--|-----------|
| 1. King Philip's War
Northern Front
(no European counterpart) | 1675-1678 |
| 2. King William's War
(1st French & Indian War)
(St. Castin's War)
(War of the League of Augsburg)
(War of the Grand Alliance) | 1688-1699 |
| 3. Queen Anne's War
(2nd French & Indian War)
(War of the Spanish Succession) | 1702-1714 |
| 4. Abenaki War
(Gov. Dummer's War)
(Lovewell's War)
(Grey Lock's War)
(no European counterpart) | 1721-1726 |
| 5. King George's War
(3rd French & Indian War)
(Gov. Shirley's War)
(War of the Austrian Succession) | 1744-1748 |
| 6. The French & Indian War
(4th French & Indian War)
(Seven Years' War) | 1754-1763 |
| 7. War for American Independence
(American Revolution)
(French fought British, too) | 1775-1783 |
| 8. War of 1812
(2nd War for American Independence)
(French not involved) | 1812-1815 |

*From east to west, the *Wabanaki* (= Dawnlanders) at one time or another included the MICMAC, MALISEET, PASSAMAQUODDY, PENOBSCOT, ABENAKI, and PENNACOOK, and the various divisions thereof.

Carignan-Salières Regiment of the regular French army. It stopped the Iroquois menace handily, thereafter settling several of its officers on strategic lands. This is how a young regimental ensign came to Acadia to become its most colorful French emigré and Wabanaki leader, too.

Jean-Vincent d'Abbadie de Saint-Castin set up headquarters as both a commercial fur trader and a governmental special agent among the Wabanaki on the eastern shore of Penobscot Bay, at Pentagoet (Castine, Maine). This was territory contested by both France and England, as well as the home of Western Etchemin paramount sagamore Madockawando. On the

death of his older brother in France, Jean-Vincent became the third Baron de Saint-Castin in 1674. Yet he stayed on among the Wabanaki people he had admired since his arrival. Married to Pidianske, Madockawando's daughter, and adopted by them, Saint-Castin became an actual leader of the Western Etchemins. His military knowledge and counsel about current events were highly valued by his father-in-law. Still the subject of scholarly debate, Jean-Vincent's influence on Wabanaki leaders and actions in both King Philip's War (1675–1678) and King William's War (1688–1699), against the English, must have been considerable (e.g., see Baker 1988).

Nonetheless, Saint-Castin was no knee-jerk chauvinistic Frenchman. He was the "Reilly, Ace of Spies" of his day, literally a law unto himself. Yet he was so respected by high government officials in Acadia, Quebec, and Paris, that they often did not call him to task when complaints against him were made by more conventional Frenchmen who did not respect him or were jealous of him. His ongoing commercial involvement with New England merchants and Indian-like behavior were easy targets for his political enemies.

Jean-Vincent was indeed unique, but of his and Pidianske's several children, two sons each carried on his duality of being at once both a French baron and a Wabanaki leader. No other one family of that time could have had as much input into Dawnland decision-making as the Madockawando/Saint-Castin clan. Yet the definitive anthropological-historical biography of them remains to be written (see Cerbelaud Salagnac 1969, 1974).

Samoset

Extreme English ethnocentrism made it highly unlikely that there would be an Anglo-Wabanaki equivalent of the Saint-Castins. The few English who did "turn Indian" mostly did so later on, and/or were not nobility, and/or were captives first. British subjects who were Celtic, instead of English, were far less ethnocentric, but mostly were outside of Wabanakia, and later on — e.g., Irishman Sir William Johnson of 18th-century New York, and the myriad Scots who kept the major fur-trading companies in business further west.

The Puritan English of New England were the most ethnocentric of all; indeed, they had come to America specifically to perfect their narrow-mindedness. However, the Wabanaki were open-minded to a fault, and into Plymouth Village one day in March 1621, strode Abnaki sagamore Samoset, saying "Welcome, English!" in English. He had learned the language from his prior contacts, and had traveled south to see for himself the Plymouth Pilgrims he had heard about. Samoset was the first Native American to interact face to face with the Pilgrims. He introduced them to his Southern New England Algonquian friends, who previously only had spied on the

English, and then returned to Maine where he belonged.

Some of the Pilgrims soon would frequent Maine, too. In the late 1620s and early 1630s, the Plymouth Colony interests established trading posts (called "truck houses") on the Kennebec and Penobscot Rivers. Although the French soon drove out the Penobscot station, the Kennebec house eventually proved so profitable that the Pilgrims were able to pay off their heavy colonization debts. Apparently, if given a choice, many Wabanaki chose regular trade with the English instead of with the French, and most Wabanaki liked at least occasional trade with the English. In the late 1600s, even French settlers on the Bay of Fundy preferred English trade goods and prices, much to the disgust and dismay of Acadia's French Commandant Villebon. As the French trade had dominated the Wabanaki in the 16th century, so the English trade dominated Wabanakia in the 17th century. The Abnakis were particularly willing pelt-producers for the English, even bartering furs from tribes allied to the French, thus poaching on the French trade monopoly centered on the St. Lawrence River (see Morrison 1974:chap. IV).

Despite the importance of fur-trading, it was quite secondary to independent farming in the minds of most New Englanders from earliest colonial settlement onward. Farming required land, cleared of trees and rocks — and clear in legal title, too, since Englishmen were very conscious of their property rights. Probably because of his supposed affability, sagamore Samoset appears historically as the supposed grantor of a deed to land at Pemaquid, Maine — to John Brown of New Harbor in 1625. If it is accepted as genuine, this is the earliest such deed known, and a remarkably complex document for the first of its kind. However, if it is the forgery that many modern scholars think it is, it is still the earliest-dated fraud in what historian Francis Jennings (1975) calls "the Deed Game" (see Baker 1989).

Even if Samoset did convey land, the intent surely could not have been monopolistic. As a sagamore, Samoset simply would have been loaning the use of a piece of his people's collectively held land — sharing its use with the English newcomers while not alienating it, either then or later, from other uses or by other users. Of course the English would claim for land, as the French would for religion, an exclusivity entirely unknown to most Native Americans. Out of such vast misunderstandings future strife was inevitable, as the English sought ever more and more land for their burgeoning populations.

Passaconaway and heirs

Of all the Wabanaki peoples, the Pennacooks were the first to suffer most from English land-grabbing. Spread all along the Merrimac River valley of today's northeastern Massachusetts and southern New Hampshire, nearest

the best fisheries, they were the most sedentary maize-horticulturalists of Wabanakia. The Pennacooks were a confederation of many separate bands under the paramount sagamoreship of Passaconaway of Penacook proper, near today's Concord, New Hampshire. What he lacked in political authority he more than made up for with impressive shamanistic powers. All indications are that Passaconaway had great influence over his widespread people. Yet so many of them had died in a series of devastating epidemics from 1612 through 1634 that he never attempted to fight the ever-encroaching English. Instead, Passaconaway's sole strategy from the 1630s onward was peaceful coexistence with them, whatever they did.

Somehow, Passaconaway was able to transplant his pacifist decision to his son Wanalancet, despite repeated evidence and constant advice that it was an unsuccessful policy. The English took fullest advantage of Pennacook pacifism to expand unchecked at their expense. In 1644 Passaconaway submitted his lands and people to the authority of Massachusetts Bay Colony. Yet even then he resisted Puritan missionary John Eliot's attempts to Christianize him. By 1662 so much Pennacook territory had been lost to the English that Passaconaway had to petition the Colony for a tract of land to live on. Yet whatever had been the land losses, Passaconaway's pacifism had kept the Pennacooks alive.

Wanalancet succeeded his father ca. 1660 and continued his policies, including resisting conversion to Christianity. However, about 1670 Wanalancet started listening to preachers and keeping the sabbath. Finally, in 1674 he "changed canoes", as he put it — i.e., he converted to Christianity. He had not done so earlier because of opposition by his council and kin. After he did convert, many of his people deserted him. Yet he maintained considerable influence, and when King Philip's War broke out in southern New England in 1675, Wanalancet insisted on Pennacook neutrality. He moved his band out of harm's way, but the English misinterpreted his intent and sent troops after him. Some Pennacook bands moved far away, at least for a while. Hostile refugees hid among neutral Indians, and the English dealt treacherously with both categories. Finally, Wanalancet withdrew his band to Canada, in 1677. His neutrality decision had proven no more effective than his father's pacifism. Together, these policies had saved their people but lost their land.

Historian Colin Calloway (1988:276) comments that "peaceful coexistence was not the only strategy open to the Pennacooks." He continues:

As in every Indian community, differences of opinion and alternative sources of leadership presented themselves in times of crisis. After a life of trials and disappointments, Wanalancet found himself "wronged by the whites; distrusted by the Indians," and it became increasingly clear that the policy of accommodation initiated by Passaconaway and continued by his son could

not guarantee the cultural survival of the Pennacooks under the pressures they faced on the New Hampshire frontier. When Wanalancet and his band migrated north in 1677, part of the Pennacooks stayed behind. This so-called "warlike" group looked for leadership to a man of different stamp — Kancagamus [sic].

Kancamagus was Passaconaway's grandson and Wanalancet's nephew, but he had rejected their policies of pacifism and neutrality as futile. His own decision for military confrontation in King William's War is described in detail in Calloway's (1988) article comparing these three major Pennacook leaders and their strategies. It need not be discussed here beyond stating that, given the prevailing English attitudes and actions, and his forerunners' passive responses, Kancamagus's decision to try a more active alternative is quite understandable. However, it was too little too late; the Pennacooks' genes live on under the names of other Native American groups, elsewhere — probably closest among Abenaki communities.

Squanto

All too often, English provocations were so outrageous that violence was the all-too-human reaction. Especially was this the case with Abnaki sagamore Squando of the lower Saco River in southern Maine (no relation to Plymouth's Squanto or Tisquantum). The event in question must be put in the context of the Indian uprising against the English in 1675 called King Philip's War. This war exploded throughout New England almost simultaneously, but had two separate and distinct aspects and battlefronts: South and North. The only common denominator of both fronts was that, by 1675, the English had managed to abuse so many rights of so many New England Indians that many Indian bands were considering vengeance.

Squanto's revenge was based on an atrocity, and his hostility seemingly triggered the Northern Front. Legend has it that some English ruffians deliberately tipped over the canoe containing Squando's wife and infant child to see if the child would swim instinctively! The child was saved by the wife, only to die of exposure. Squando was a noted shaman, but had become partly interested in English religion, particularly the Puritans' Old Testament emphasis. He not only doubly cursed the English but also decided to exterminate as many as he could. Squando's religious ruminations abruptly ended his vendetta, however. He supposedly hanged himself in response to the promises made him by the Englishman's God, who visited him in a dream (see Morrison 1974:chap. IV).

There has been considerable scholarly debate over the issue of how much, and what kind of, French involvement there was in the Northern Front of King Philip's War. Officially, the French claimed none at all. However, to assume that baron-sagamore Saint-Castin only ran a trading post at

Pentagoet on Penobscot Bay throughout this 1675–1678 conflict would be naive. Recently, historian Emerson Baker (1988) has published a research note summarizing this debate and describing some new evidence — a letter recently acquired by Maine Historical Society. Written by two highly reputable Maine citizen-leaders to Massachusetts Governor Leverett, this letter details the presence of “two or three Frenchmen” with the attacking Wabanaki at besieged Black Point (Scarboro, Maine, near Portland) in September 1676. The Frenchmen were reported by an English wounded man (in hiding) as having stated (within his hearing) their intent to capture all the English settlements along the Maine coast. Inasmuch as the Frenchmen’s remarks were part of an interrogation of English prisoners, an Indian was translating them into English. This seems to be a boastful indication of French involvement, the official policy to the contrary notwithstanding.

Madockawando

If Squando of the Saco River led the Northern Front’s pro-war faction, Madockawando of Penobscot Bay led the pro-peace party, both in King Philip’s War and in the later King William’s War. Before these wars, the French had worked to keep their Wabanaki fur-trade partners away from the English, for obviously selfish commercial reasons. Now French military policy in King William’s War (and subsequent conflicts) sought to maintain a buffer zone of actively English-hostile Wabanaki between New France (including Acadia) and New England. It was a purely exploitative use of their Wabanaki partners, and some Wabanaki were well aware of being used — Madockawando, in particular. So, the French worked constantly to color this exploitation as prettily as possible, and they achieved success in making many a Wabanaki warrior happy to serve King Louis’ cause.

Joseph Robineau de Villebon, the French commandant in Acadia, was singularly able at influencing the Wabanaki. Rather than risk English raids at Port Royal, Villebon located his headquarters up the St. John River, deep in Eastern Etchemin territory. From this base, which was relatively accessible to canoeing Wabanaki, Villebon dispensed, at many a feast, King Louis’ annual gifts for all the Wabanaki, and brevet-officer commissions for cooperative sagamores. Villebon carefully learned the rules of the game of Wabanaki politics, and he played them hard and successfully. After the great Madockawando tired of being exploited by the French, and started leading a pro-peace party and parleying with the English, Villebon put a quick stop to his waywardness by a masterful political ploy. Villebon publicly adopted as his brother a Penobscot River sagamore named Taxous, who was a subordinate of Madockawando, thus both humiliating the great chief and threatening the entire power structure of his Etchemin-Abnaki alliance (see Webster 1934).

Madockawando was the last of the Wabanaki paramount sagamores, and his influence was extremely widespread. He had been adopted as the son of a noted Kennebec River chief, Assiminasqua. By such adoptions, the powerless authority of Wabanaki sagamores was greatly enhanced. Marriages offered another means of prestige augmentation, and Madockawando's daughter was the Baroness Saint-Castin. Madockawando greatly relied on his son-in-law's advice, but nevertheless he was secure enough to be quite independent. When he did not wish to make war, or had had enough of war, he abstained with impunity.

Despite his pro-French environment at Pentagoet on Penobscot Bay, Madockawando ceased his participation in King William's War after his surprisingly unsuccessful raid on Wells, Maine, in 1692. It was to have been a model raid, to make up for a failure there (led by another chief) in 1691. It seems likely that, as a shaman, Madockawando took the double failure at Wells as an omen to stop fighting. Then, when the omen was coupled with evidences of English superiority in numbers, and of French exploitation of the Wabanaki, peace seemed to him to be essential for Wabanaki survival.

The French, understandably, supported the pro-war opposition party, led by Taxous. When Madockawando signed a 1693 treaty with the English, he went beyond French tolerance, and had to be controlled, lest he cost the French the war. Therefore, Taxous was raised as a puppet foil. Taxous returned to Pentagoet, and, coached by resident priest Thury, challenged Madockawando to return to the warpath or become "contemptible to all the young Indians", as Villebon put it. The great chief himself and the alliance he headed both would have succumbed if he had not returned to the warpath, so return he did. He had no real choice. Taxous remained both bumptious and a subordinate sagamore. Madockawando apparently regained full prestige, for he succeeded to a sagamoreship on the St. John River (in Villebon's vicinity) in addition to his other leadership responsibilities. He died about 1698, leaving a definite power vacuum in Wabanakia.

Analysis

The events of the 17th century clearly show that both French and English were concerned, directly and deeply, with the military potential of the Wabanaki, and thus, indirectly but negatively, with their integrity as independent peoples. As of 1700, the French still could not be certain of Wabanaki loyalty to King Louis XIV, despite the ever-increasing Wabanaki enmity toward the English. Wabanaki ethnic integrity surely had been diminished during the 1600s, but was still sufficient at the end of the century to worry both the French and the English.

Decisions, both great and trivial, by Wabanaki leaders, and the consequences of these decisions, can be seen as indicators of maintenance or loss

of Wabanaki ethnic integrity throughout the 1600s. While the basic intent of this paper is to outline these decisions, it also must look toward their analysis. These decisions can become the focal points in a simple functional model, which also must consider adaptation to changing conditions. Both integrity and adaptation are the key requirements, not only for this study-model but for actual Wabanaki survival. Each of the decisions considered in this paper had major consequences, either planned or unforeseen. In analyzing these decisions, we can see the directions, intended or unintended, toward which the Wabanaki sagamores pointed their peoples. The assessment is more than mere score-keeping, because French or English success may or may not have meant Wabanaki failure, and vice versa. In some affairs, all involved could gain or lose, directly or indirectly.

If one desires a more complex and eclectic model to analyze our "Dawnland Director's Decisions," the makings thereof may be found in a new book by anthropologist Walter Goldschmidt (1990). As the book's dust jacket states it, Goldschmidt argues that

change rather than equilibrium is the natural condition of society; that humans must be seen as motivated actors rather than as passive recipients of cultural roles; and that emotions, rather than intellect, are the crucial element in the formulation of culture. These three elements, combined with established theory — ecology, evolution and the rest — form a dynamic model of human sociality.

Surely, meaningful study of the Wabanaki peoples requires as dynamic a model as one can get, given both their double frontier and their receptiveness to the new challenges coming their way.

It requires a delicate balance indeed for a people to maintain their ethnic integrity while adapting to changes forced upon them from outside. "Ethnic integrity" herein means a people's social and cultural self-determination, which must at least imply political self-governance if not economic self-sufficiency. The Wabanaki early elected to join the European fur trade, thus compromising their traditional economic independence. But, beyond that, they were self-governing peoples, until French and English intruders tried to take over their lives or lands. To the extent that the Europeans succeeded in these usurpations, the Wabanaki lost ethnic integrity.

"Adapting to changes" here means a people's development of social and cultural responses which are adjustive and accommodative to new environmental stimuli. Unwillingness or inability to make adaptive responses to the stimuli of change usually proves fatal to a people. But they may choose to succumb with their ethnic integrity intact, however irrational it may seem to outsiders, because they value their collective honor higher than their mere existence. At the other extreme, ethnic integrity may be sacrificed totally as an excessive form of adjustment to change. A people may try to buy their

assimilation into another sociocultural group this way. On the whole, the 17th-century Wabanaki peoples can be seen as ever more inclined toward accommodating the French, yet certainly not entirely, lest they lose their honor thereby.

Wabanaki sagamores decidedly were not passive straws in a European whirlwind. They did not just simply react to the stimuli of arriving Europeans. They actively seized opportunities to pursue their own agenda, and to make their own decisions, irrespective of European desires. If some sagamores seem more self-serving than group-oriented, consider the nature of their "authorityless" leadership. No sagamore could have any more decision-making power over constituents than was granted through the reciprocity between leader and led. Demonstrating personal connections with outside forces — supernatural and foreign human — seems to have been a common means used to impress a sagamore's constituency. Yet deciding land cessions or forfeitures to foreigners — i.e., decisions well beyond sharing the use of communal land — seem outside the range of acceptable decision-making for any traditional Wabanaki sagamore.

Indeed, today, from both east and west ends of Wabanakia, Native Americans claim that Micmacs and Abenakis never did surrender their land rights to white men. Furthermore, they contend, any treaty-making attempts now must start with the recognition of that fact by white men. Recent Indian land-claims cases can be seen to be continuations of the colonial period's treaty-making processes. One well might wonder if the new treaties will be considered any more just or satisfying foreign-affairs decisions, in the long run, than their earlier counterparts have been.

While this paper is concerned only with 17th-century sagamores' decisions, it must glance ahead for perspective. By 1702, the twig already had been bent that would grow into at least the whipping-post for Wabanaki independence, if not its hanging-tree. Despite the "Sorrowful Decade" of King William's War just past, France and England were at war again in Europe by 1702, and New France and New England prepared for the inevitable New World extension of hostilities. New France again called upon the Wabanaki to fight for King Louis, while New England attempted to keep the Wabanaki neutral, via treaty of friendship at Casco Bay (Portland, Maine), in June 1703. By this time, according to historian Douglas Leach (1973:129):

the New England colonies had further increased their population advantage over New France, the former counting now nearly 100,000 inhabitants as against New France's 15,000. This huge discrepancy, together with a comparable difference in material resources, limited the French to little more than a campaign of harassment along the frontier.

However real these odds were against them, and however real was the June 1703 friendship treaty, some Wabanaki were back raiding Maine settlements

for the French cause in August 1703.

Some Wabanaki had decided on raising the hatchet against the English again because of new French inducements, others from old unresolved grievances, still others from lust for glory. The honeyed tongue of a new political priest, Jesuit Sebastien Rale, and other French siren-singers would continue to make the short-term benefits of fighting for King Louis seem to outweigh the long-term threats to Wabanaki existence, let alone independence. As the old adage so aptly puts it, with some people for friends one needs no enemies. Some Wabanaki would decide to fight for their friends the French until the French total eclipse came in 1763, thus making absolutely irreconcilable enemies of the English. Yet, if the Wabanaki had decided on 18th-century peace with the English, would they have fared any better than did 17th-century pacifist-expatriate Wanalancet?

Conclusion

Ecologically, economically, and technologically the Wabanaki increasingly jeopardized their independence as they became ever more enmeshed in European commerce. About 1650, the Wabanaki willingly were sharing their lands with the English and their souls with the French. However, the end result of these sharings was that the English stole Wabanaki lands and the French stole Wabanaki souls, in each case to use them exclusively, selfishly, and politically. This easily gave the French an advantage over the English because the tangible evidence of encroachment was so one-sided.

French missionary zeal, especially enhanced by Gallican fervor, sought eventual conversion of all the natives of Wabanakia. New England, whether Separatist or Anglican in doctrine, collectively cared very little about missionizing the Indians, the neighborhood of Boston being the basic area of the token attempts made by John Eliot. Thus, the Pennacook were the only Wabanaki affected by English missionizing, and the English missed the propaganda opportunity which so greatly enhanced the French political cause until their 1763 ouster from the Northeast.

English frontiersmen and government policies often were conspicuously callous toward Indians, relative to those of the French, at least. Yet many Wabanaki local sagamores made regular trading with the English their norm, except in times of open warfare or of close French supervision, apparently considering English goods enough better in quality, quantity, or price to merit the greater potential inconveniences. The clearest distinction between the attitudes and behaviour of the French and the English toward American Indians in general can be seen in ecological terms. While in both theory and practice both New France and New England were engaged in both fur trading and colonization, the relative overall emphasis of New France became fur trading and that of New England became coloniza-

tion. This, then, became the major contrast in the encounters, as far as the Wabanaki were concerned. The French maintained attitudes of cooperation and continual sharing of the land, with Indians considered as helpers in their endeavors. The English developed attitudes of competition and eventual conflict over the land, with Indians considered as hindrances in their endeavors.

Three terms neatly summarize the major sociopolitical trends of Wabanaki-European contacts: French exploitation, English expatriation, and white encapsulation of the Wabanaki. All three trends resulted in increasing loss of ethnic integrity by the Dawnlanders. The French developed friendly social relations with the Wabanaki, and took advantage of them at least to form a protective buffer-zone between New France and New England (in which peaceful interaction with the English was discouraged), when not actually pressuring them to be active belligerents for France. The English developed workaday trade relations with the Wabanaki (which were satisfactory to both parties), but the ever-advancing hordes of British settlers deprived the Wabanaki first of the use of their own lands, then of the possession and occupancy of them. Both French and English-speaking peoples encapsulated the Wabanaki, as anthropologist Frederick G. Bailey (1969) uses the term. The French more or less incorporated the Wabanaki into French political structures, from 1605 to 1763. The English-speaking peoples simply surrounded and isolated the remaining Wabanaki thereafter, taking them into pragmatic account only in the War for American Independence and the War of 1812, and again recently, in modern land-claims cases.

When the French regime closed in 1763 — long after Membertou and Madockawando — the Wabanaki (throughout the entire duration of the French-English conflict) had fought only for the French cause, and at most only had abstained temporarily from fighting against the English. Land deeds and peace treaties had been the unsuccessful instruments of English policy, while aid agreements (supported by annual gifts from King Louis) had been the profitable mode of French diplomacy, to lure the Wabanaki into French territory and military service, lest the French religious stimulus alone prove insufficient.

That any Wabanaki sagamores were able to avoid total Frenchification is amazing; yet some did decide to hold out for whatever independence they could keep. To them must go the credit for husbanding the dwindling ethnic integrity of the Dawnlanders. They were the fire-keepers from the past whose legacy now has been rekindled in the present by their descendants throughout much of Wabanakia — still very much at home there, where they belong. Still adaptively flexible, today's leaders of the Dawnlanders continue the long tradition of parrying and parlaying the ongoing Encounter.

REFERENCES

- Bailey, Frederick G.
 1969 *Stratagems and Spoils: A Social Anthropology of Politics*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Baker, Emerson W.
 1988 New Evidence on the French Involvement in King Philip's War. *Maine Historical Society Quarterly* 28(2):85-91.
 1989 "A Scratch with a Bear's Paw": Anglo-Indian Land Deeds in Early Maine. *Ethnohistory* 36:235-256.
- Biard, Pierre
 1611 Lettre . . . (Port Royal, Juin 10, 1611). Document 4. *Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, Vol. 1 (1896). Reuben G. Thwaites, ed. Cleveland: Burrows Brothers.
 1616 Relation . . . (Paris 1616 and Lyons 1616). Document 14. *Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, Vols. 3 and 4 (1897). Reuben G. Thwaites, ed. Cleveland: Burrows Brothers.
- Bourque, Bruce J.
 1989 Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula, 1600-1759. *Ethnohistory* 36: 257-284.
- Calloway, Colin G.
 1988 Wanalancet and Kancagamus [sic]: Indian Strategy and Leadership on the New Hampshire Frontier. *Historical New Hampshire* 43(4):264-290.
- Cerbelaud Salagnac, Georges
 1969 Abbadie de Saint-Castin, Bernard-Anselme d'. Pp. 3-4; Jean-Vincent d'. Pp. 4-7 in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, Vol. 2. David M. Hayne, gen. ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
 1974 Abbadie de Saint-Castin, Joseph d'. P. 3 in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, Vol. 3. Frances G. Halpenny, gen. ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Cohen, Ronald
 1973 Political Anthropology. Chap. 19 in *Handbook of Social and Cultural Anthropology*. John J. Honigsmann, ed. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Fried, Morton H.
 1960 On the Evolution of Social Stratification and the State. Pp. 713-731 in *Culture in History: Essays in Honor of Paul Radin*. Stanley Diamond, ed. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Goetz, Thomas H.
 1975 English Translation of Marc Lescarbot [The Defeat of the Armouchiquois Savages]. Pp. 159-179 in *Papers of the Sixth Algonquian Conference, 1974*. William Cowan, ed. *National Museum of Man Mercury Series* 23. Ottawa.
- Goldschmidt, Walter
 1990 *The Human Career: The Self in the Symbolic World*. Cambridge, Mass: Basil Blackwell.

Hoffman, Bernard G.

- 1955 Souriquois, Etechemin, and Kwedech — A Lost Chapter in American Ethnography. *Ethnohistory* 2:65-87.

Jennings, Francis

- 1975 *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Leach, Douglas Edward

- 1973 *Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763*. New York: Macmillan.

Malinowski, Bronislaw

- 1948 *Myth in Primitive Psychology*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. [1926.]

Morrison, Alvin H.

- 1974 Dawnland Decisions: 17th Century Wabanaki Leaders and Their Responses to the Differential Contact Stimuli in the Overlap Area of New France and New England. Ph.D. thesis, SUNY/Buffalo.
- 1975 Membertou's Raid on the Chouacoet "Almouchiquois" — The Micmac Sack of Saco in 1607. Pp. 141-158 in *Papers of the Sixth Algonquian Conference, 1974*. William Cowan, ed. *National Museum of Man Mercury Series* 23. Ottawa.
- 1976 Dawnland Directors: Status and Role of 17th Century Wabanaki Sagamores. Pp. 495-517 in *Papers of the Seventh Algonquian Conference, 1975*. William Cowan, ed. Ottawa: Carleton University.
- 1978 Penobscot Country: Disagreement Over Who Lived There in the 17th Century Needs Resolving, if Possible. Pp. 47-54 in *Papers of the Ninth Algonquian Conference*. William Cowan, ed. Ottawa: Carleton University.
- 1984 Blackrobe in Boston: Rare Man/Rare Moment. Pp. 193-200 in *Papers of the Fifteenth Algonquian Conference*. William Cowan, ed. Ottawa: Carleton University.

Prins, Harald E.L.

- 1986 Micmacs and Maliseets in the St. Lawrence River Valley. Pp. 263-278 in *Actes du dix-septième congrès des algonquinistes*. William Cowan, ed. Ottawa: Carleton University.

Salisbury, Neal

- 1982 *Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500-1643*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Trigger, Bruce G., ed.

- 1978 *Handbook of North American Indians*, Vol. 15: *Northeast*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution.

Webster, John Clarence

- 1934 Acadia at the End of the 17th Century: Letters, Journals, and Memoirs of Joseph Roineau de Villebon Commandant in Acadia, 1690-1700, and Other Contemporary Documents. *Monograph Series* No. 1. Saint John: New Brunswick Museum.